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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
seeking it 4 and that, without this assurance of confidentiality, patients
might repress violent thoughts with tragic consequences.4 5 However,
the dissent seems to have overlooked the most significant consider-
ation involved-the lives of possible victims that may be saved by
the creation of a duty to warn.
The incidence of mental illness in North Dakota is not as wide-
spread as in California. Nevertheless, the import of Tarasoff cannot
be completely overlooked by psychiatrists in North Dakota.
A question similar to the one posed in Tarasoff has been address-
ed by the federal courts in North Dakota. In Merchants National
Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 46 a psychologist treating a dan-
gerous mental patient at a veteran's hospital was held to be negli-
gent in failing to bring evidence of the patient's mental condition
to the attention of the hospital personnel. 47 With such notice they
could have evaluated the evidence and presumably could have re-
fused to allow the patient to leave, thus possibly preventing the mur-
der that the patient committed shortly after his departure from the
hospital. While the court did not specifically rely upon a duty to warn
for its finding of liability, a fair reading of this decision does indicate
a possible basis for future rulings on this issue.
Violence is an ever-increasing and tragic consequence of mental
illness. Society has a right to demand protection from this violence
and the mentally ill have a concomitant right to psychotherapeutic
treatment. The therapist, however, is caught in the middle of this
struggle of rights. Since he is involved with potentially dangerous
individuals and is given the power to detain those suspected of being
dangerous,4S the public may tend to perceive him as an agent of so-
ciety whose duty is to protect society from the hidden danger confided
to him by his patients. The therapist is similarly seen as a confidant
by the patient in whom he can confide his deepest secrets. By im-
posing a duty to warn on the therapist only when the patient's con-
fidences reveal a preventable danger to a third person, the California
Supreme Court has provided a fair and equitable solution to the thera-
pist's dilemma.
KENT M. MORROW
CRIMINAL LAW-ENTRAPMENT-IF DEFENDANT IS PREDISPOSED To
COMMIT THE OFFENSE, No DEFENSE OF ENTRAPMENT EXISTS, EVEN
IF GOVERNMENT AGENT SUPPLIES THE CONTRABAND.
44. Id. at 459-60, 551 P.2d at 359-60, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 39-40.
45. Id. at 459, 551 P.2d at 359, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 39. See also In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d
415, 426, 467 P.2d 557, 564, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 836 (1970).
46. 272 F. Supp. 409 (D.N.D. 1967).
47. Id. at 418.
48. N D. CENT. CODE § 25-03-08 (1970).
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Charles Hampton was convicted in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Missouri for distribution of heroin.,
The heroin was allegedly 2 supplied to defendant by a paid govern-
ment informer, and defendant subsequently sold the drug to the au-
thorities pursuant to a plan arranged by the informant. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the convic-
tion,3 denying defendant's claim that the due process clause of the
fifth amendment forbid the conviction if the contraband had been
supplied by the government. 4 The United States Supreme Court af-
firmed.5 Hampton v. United States, - U.S.- , 96 S. Ct. 1646
(1976).
"Entrapment, as it is now recognized in the federal system, is
not a matter of statutory prescription, nor has it ever been. . .. "6
The origin of the entrapment doctrine7 and its current status de-
rives from three opinions of the United States Supreme Court: Sor-
rells v. United States," Sherman v. United States,9 and United
States v. Russell.10 Although it is generally agreed that entrapment
1. Hampton's conviction was based upon a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) (1972).
2. Although the facts concerning who had provided the heroin were disputed, the
court of appeals did consider defendant's "entrapment instruction" on the merits. The
requested instruction provided in part:
If you find that the defendant's sales of narcotics were sales of narcotics
supplied to him by an informer in the employ of or acting on behalf of the
government, then you must acquit the defendant because the law forbids his
conviction in such a case.
Hampton v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 1646, 1648 (1976).
3. United States v. Hampton, 507 F.2d 832, 833 (1974). Judge Heaney dissented on
the grounds that entrapment should be established as a matter of law to a charge of pos-
sessing contraband, where such contraband was supplied by a government agent. Id. at
836-37.
4. In view of the Court's earlier holdings in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435
(1932), Sherman v. United, States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958), and United States v. Russell, 411
U.S. 423 (1973) defendant did not request a standard entrapment instruction, but instead
contended that the policy of the law forbade conviction. United States v. Hampton, 507
F.2d 832, 833 (8th Cir. 1974). The court of appeals rejected that argument, since it be-
lieved that Russell foreclosed it from considering any theory of entrapment founded on
something other than defendant's lack of predisposition, id. at 835, and since it was con-
ceded by defendant's counsel that he was predisposed to commit the offense, he was
entitled to no'other entrapment instruction, id. at 836 & n.5.
5. Justice Rehnquist wrote for the plurality of the Court and was joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justice White. Justice Rehnquist also wrote for the majority in United
States v. Russell,. 411 U.S. 423 (1971), and was there jointed by Justices Burger, White,
Blackmun, and Powell. Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion in Hampton in which
Justice Blackmun joined. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion in Hampton in which
.Justices Stewart and Marshall joined. Justices Stewart, Brennan, and Marshall had also
dissented in Russell, as did Justice Douglas, who retired in November 1975. Justice Doug-
las was replaced by Justice Stevens, who took no part in the consideration or decision
of Hlanmpton.
6. 1 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE REFORM OF THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING
PAPERS, 303 (1970) [hereinafter cited as WORKING PAPERS].
7. It was not until 1915 that a federal court gave recognition to the entrapment doc-
trine. Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915). Although the United States
Supreme Court first applied the entrapment doctrine in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S.
435 (1932), it had earlier considered the entrapment defense in Grimm v. United States,
156 U.S. 604 (1895), and Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413 (1928), but failed to find
government inducement in either case. For a study on the early developments of the doc-
trine of entrapment, see 'Murchison, The Entrapment Defense in Federal Courts: 
Emergence
of aI Legal Doctrine, 47 Miss. L.J. 211 (1976).
8. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
9. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
10. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
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includes the "planning of an offense by an officer, and his procure-
ment of its commission by one who would not have perpetrated it
except for the trickery, persuasion, or fraud of the officer. . . .- 11 the
majority and minority 2 opinions of the three leading cases have dis-
agreed on whether the defendant must be an "innocent" person or
whether his predisposition to commit the crime is immaterial in
view of the police conduct in question.
In Sorrells v. United States,"1 defendant was convicted for
possessing and selling liquor during Prohibition. 14 A government in-
former had made repeated attempts upon defendant to procure liquor,
"taking advantage of the sentiment aroused by reminiscences of their
experiences as companions in arms in the World War. '15 The Su-
preme Court reversed the conviction, finding "that defendant had no
previous disposition to commit it but was an industrious, law-abiding
citizen . . . otherwise innocent .... "16 The Court thus focused
on the character of the particular defendant and established what
has become generally known as the subjective test. 7 The Court in
Sorrells found the entrapment defense to be based on an "implied
exception" in the statute, stating: "[T]he question is whether the
defense . . . takes the case out of the purview of the statutebe-
cause it cannot be supposed that the Congress intended that the let-
ter of its enactment should be used to support such a gross perver-
sion of its purpose."' 18 Thus, an entrapped person not being covered
by the statute, was not guilty of the crime in question, and his en-
trapment defense was raised by a not-guilty plea. 19 Furthermore,
under this approach, the defendant's past criminal record becomes
important since the jury is to assess the defendant's pre-disposition
to commit the crime.
20
Justice Roberts, concurring in the result in Sorrells, advanced
11. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 454 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring).
12. The minority approach was first articulated by Justice Roberts in Sorrells. Id. at
453-59. It was endorsed by Justice Frankfurter's concurring cpinion in Sherman v. United
States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958) and Justice Stewart's dissent in United States v. Russell, 411
U.S. 423 (1973).
13. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
14. Id. at 438-39.
15. Id. at 441.
16. Id.
17. In differentiating the subjective and objective tests it has been said that:
The words 'subjective' and 'objective' are commonly used labels for the two
standard formulations of the entrapment doctrine. The words are meant to
refer to the circumstance that the 'objective' approach considers whether
the conduct of police agents would have tempted a hypothetical person, while
the 'subjective' anproach considers whether the defendant himself was led
astray by the government's conduct.
Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. Rgv. 163, 165n.2 (1976).
18. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 452 (1932).
19. Id.
20. The Court stated:
[I]f the defendant seeks acquittal by reason of entrapment he cannot
complain of an appropriate and searching inquiry into his own conduct and
predisposition as bearing upon that issue.
Id. at 451.
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what has become generally known as the objective test of entrap-
ment.2 1 The objective approach emphasizes police conduct 22  and
"[tihe applicable principle is that courts must be closed to the
trial of a crime instigated by the government's own agents.
12 3 Jus-
tice Roberts felt that the entrapment defense was not based upon
an implied exception to the statute, 24 but "rather on a fundamental
rule of public policy."' 25 Under this approach, the entrapment de-
fense is raised by a motion to dismiss and the court, rather than
the jury, decides the question of the propriety of the law enforce-
ment agents' behavior.
26
The majority approach was affirmed in Sherman v. United
States.2 7 The court reasoned that to adopt the objective approach
espoused by Justice Roberts would "entail both overruling a leading
decision [Sorrells] of this court and brushing aside the possibility
that we would be creating more problems than we would supposedly
be solving." 
28
Due to the holdings in Sorrells and Sherman, the distinction be-
tween the majority and minority views seemed to be largely of ac-
ademic interest.2 9 The Court, however, reconsidered the theory of
21. 1M. at 459. Justice Roberts was also joined by Justices Brandeis and Stone.
22. Under the objective approach, the question is asked:
[W]as that conduct, objectively considered, such that it involved a sub-
stantial risk of inducing persons to engage in forbidden conduct who would
not ordinarily engage in that sort of conduct?
W. LAFAVE & A. Sco'r, CRIMINAL LAW 371 (1972).
23. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 459 (1932).
24. Justice Roberts stated:
This amounts to saying that one who with full intent commits the act
defined by law as an offense is nevertheless by virtue of the unspoken and
implied' mandate nf the statute to be adjudged not guilty by reason of some-
one's else [sic] improper conduct.
Id. at 456.
25. Id. at 457. Justice Frankfurter concurring in Sherman v. United States, 856 U.S.
369 (1958), stated:
The courts refuse to convict an entrapped defendant, not because his conduct
falls outside the proscription of the statute, but because, even if his guilt be
admitted, the methods employed on behalf of the government to bring about
the conviction cannot be countenanced.
Id. at 380.
26. "It is the province of the court and of the court alone to protect itself and the
government from such prostitution of the criminal law." Sorrells v. United States, 287
U.S. 435, 457 (1932).
27. 356 U.S. 369 (1958). The facts in Sorrells and Sherman were very similar. In Sher-
man, defendant was convicted for selling. narcotics to a government informer. While de-
fendant and informer were both being treated for narcotics addiction, the informer re-
peatedly asked defendant to supply him with drugs as he was not responding 
to treat-
ment. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction emphasizing the continuous 
pleadings
by the informant and the fact that defendant had been "induced" to return to the use 
of
narcotics. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 373, 376 (1958).
28. Id. at 377-78.
29. In both Sorrells and Sherman, the minority view was set forth in concurring opinions
that entrapment had been proved. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in 
Sherman, felt that
Justice Robert's approach should be adopted or at least considered by the majority.
The fact that since the Sorrells case the lower courts have either ignored its
theory and continued to rest decisions on the narrow facts of each case, 
or
have failed after penetrating effort to define a satisfactory generalization . • •
is proof that the prevailing theory of the Sorrells case ought not to be deemed
the last word.
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 379 (1958). Due to the 
controversy Involved, this
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entrapment in United States v. Russell3 ° on the contention that the
entrapment defense should rest on constitutional grounds.
In Russell, defendant was convicted 'of the manufacture and dis-
tribution of methamphetamine, more commonly called "speed". 31 A
government undercover agent had provided defendant with an es-
sential ingredient 32 in the manufacture of the drug. Defendant con-
tended that the Court should adopt a rigid constitutional rule, 33 "that
would preclude any prosecution when it is shown that the criminal
conduct would not have been possible had not an undercover agent
'supplied an indispensable means to the commission of the crime
that could not have been obtained otherwise, through legal or illegal
channels.' -34 The Court declined to adopt such a rule, emphasizing
that the ingredient provided to defendant was legal and that de-
fendant had continued making the drug after the ingredient had
been depleted. 35 However, the Court added this caveat: "[Wie may
some day be presented with a situation in which the conduct of law
enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would
absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to
obtain a cinviction.
3 6
Thus, the "predisposition" approach apparently controlled in Rus-
sell, since defendant did not fit within his own proposed rule. The
Court left open for a case by case adjudication the question of what
types of law enforcement conduct might be sufficiently outrageous
to bar prosecutionn, 3 7 and several courts responded to this cue.38
In United States v. Bueno,3 9 the Fifth Circuit found entrapment
area of the law has sparked a wealth of material on the subject. The overwhelming ma-
jority of commentators have favored the minority approach. See Park, slipra note 17, at
167n.13. The fact that scholarly opinion favors the objective test is reflected in United
States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973). In Russell the majority opinion relied solely upon
case -law, id. at 428-36, whereas the dissenting opinion claimed the support of a majority
of commentators, id. at 445n.3.
30. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
31. Id. at 424.
32. Id. at 426. Although the ingredient was legally obtainable, it was very difficult
to obtain.
33. Defendant conceded that he may have harbored a predisposition to commit the
offense, but contended that the government was so involved in the manufacture of the drug
that a criminal prosecution violated the fundamental principles of due process. Id. at 430.
34. Id. at 431.
35. Id. at 431-32.
36. Id.
37. See Peitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 5, United States v. Hanmpton, 96 S. Ct. 1646
(1976).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Oquendo, 490 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1974) ; Greene v. United
States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971) ; United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971) ;
United States v. Dillett, 254 F. Supp. 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) ; State v. Bocelli, 105 Ariz. 405,
467 P.2d 740 (1970) ; State v. Powell, - N.C. App.- , 181 S.E.2d 754 (1971).
On the basis of these cases defendant in Hampton argued:
[B]oth prior and subsequent to Russell, there has been a growing body of
authority that universally condemned one particular law enforcement prac-
tice-that of supnlying the very contraband to the defendant that was the
subject of the offense with which he was charged.
Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 5, United States v. Hampton, 96 S. Ct. 1646 (1976).
39. 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971).
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as a matter of law, regardless of predisposition, when a government
informer furnished the drugs to defendant for sale to a government
agent.40 The Third Circuit agreed and followed the Fifth Circuit ap-
proach in United States v. West.
41
However, most circuit courts of appeal that have considered the
matter have concluded that the mere supplying of contraband does
not constitute entrapment or otherwise bar the defendant's prosecu-
tion.
42
The Eighth Circuit chose this latter approach in Hampton v. Uni-
ted States43 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari"4 to resolve
the conflict among the circuits. The Court, in affirming the appellate
court's opinion, appeared to enunicate a per se rule:" 5 "[In Russell]
[wle ruled out the possibility that the defense of entrapment could
ever be based upon governmental misconduct in a case, such as this
one, where the predisposition of the defendant to commit the crime
was established. '46 The Court further held: "The remedy of the crim-
inal defendant with respect to the acts of government agents, which
. . . are encouraged by him, lies solely in the defense of entrap-
ment. ' '47 The Court rejected defendant's argument involving a vio-
lation of his due process rights, finding that defendant's case differed
from Russell only in degree, not in kind.4" Although the government
played a more significant role in Hampton by supplying the contra-
band, rather than just a legal ingredient as in Russell, defendant
conceded that he was predisposed to commit the crime for which
he was convicted, and this was found to render the defense of en-
trapment unavailable to him.
4 9
Justice Brennan, in dissent, found that Hampton was distinguish-
able from Russell on two grounds: The chemical supplied in Russell
was not contraband, and the defendant in Russell was an active par-
ticipant in the enterprise both before and after the government agent
appeared on the scene.5 0 Justice Brennan felt that entrapment under
the subjective approach was only one possible defense 1 and would
40. The Fifth Circuit held that where the government had provided the contraband',
there was entrapment as a matter of law. Id. at 905-06. The Fifth Circuit has also held
that Bueno was unaffected by Russell. See, e.g., United States v. Mosely, 496 F.2d 1012
(5th Cir. 1974) ; United States v. Oquendo, 490 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1974).
41. 511 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Spivey, 508 F.2d 146 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v.
McGrath, 494 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1974) ; United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir.
1973) ; United States v. Johnson. 484 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1973).
43. 507 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1974).
44. 420 U.S. 1003 (1975).
45. Although concurring In the result, Justice Powell felt that Russell controlled and
there was no need to enunciate such a rule. Hampton v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 1646.
1650 (1976).
46. Id. at 1649 (emphasis added).
47. Id. (emphasis added).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1653.
51. Id. at 1654. Justice Brennan agreed with the suggestion in Justice Powell's con-
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have held that "conviction is barred as a matter of law where the
subject of the criminal charge is the sale of contraband provided
to the defendant by a Government agent. ' 52
The test of entrapment in North Dakota is the objective or mi-
nority approach. The North Dakota statute5 3 provides:
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement agent induces
the commission of an offense, using persuasion or other
means likely to cause normally law-abiding persons to com-
mit the offense. Conduct. merely affording a person an oppor-
tunity to commit an offense does not constitute entrapment
5 4
Thus, in North Dakota "[t]he question is not whether the agent's
behavior actually caused the specific individual to commit the of-
fense but whether such behavior would be likely to cause a 'nor-
mally law abiding person' to commit it."" The National Commis-
sion on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws has stated that under the
objective approach to entrapment, "[tlhe defense is treated pri-
marily as a curb upon improper law enforcement techniques, to
to which the predisposition of the particular defendant is irrele-
vant."58
The plurality's holding in Hampton appears to extend the line
of entrapment decisions to the following proposition: "[T]he con-
cept of fundamental fairness inherent in the guarantee of due pro-
cess would never prevent the conviction of a predisposed defendant,
regardless of the outrageousness of police behavior in light of the
surrounding circumstances. "5 7 Although the plurality reasoned that
Hampton was governed by the Russell decision, their opinion exten-
ded permissible police behavior beyond the boundaries of Russell.
Russell was based on a limited fact situation and was further cloud-
ed by the Court's caveat concerning due process. The plurality
in Hampton re-affirmed the "pre-disposition" approach and, in so
doing, overturned a substantial number of federal decisions.5 9
curring opinion that, where police conduct is outrageous, a ,lftndant can either argue that
there was a violaton of due process or appeal to thQ Court's supervisory power to bar
the conviction. Id. at 1651.
52. Id. at 1654. This is the Fifth Circuit approach, which was announced in United
States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971).
53. N.D. CENT. ConE § 12.1-05-11 (1976). The new criminal code became effective on
July 1, 1975. Although the old code did not statutorily authorize entrapment, there is a
North Dakota Supreme Court decision that has recognized it. State v. Currie, 13 N.D. 655,
102 N.W. 875 (1905).
54. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-11(2) (1976).
55. A Hornbook to the North Dakota Criminal Code, 50 N.D.L. REV. 639, 680-81 quoting
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-11(2) (1976).
56. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE REFORM OF THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL RE-
PORT, § 702 Comment (1971).
57. Hampton v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 1646, 1651 (1976), (Powell, J. concurring)
(emphasis added).
58. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
59. See text accompanying notes 38-42 supra.
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The effect of the decision in Hampton may be to hasten legis-
latures 0 into adopting entrapment statutes.61 The advantage of an
entrapment statute is that it "can organize and define the subject
of all entrapment without regard to the specific factual circumstances
that often restrict the generality of a judicial opinion."e2
The controversy concerning entrapment which began with the
Court's opinion in Sorrells is still prevelant today. Although it is gen-
erally agreed that "criminal activity is such that stealth and strat-
egy are necessary weapons in the arsenal of the police officer,'6
3
there is still dispute as to when stealth and strategy become the
"manufacturing of crime. '6 4
BRUCE QUICK
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-COURT AUTHORIZED,
UNANNOUNCED, BREAKING AND ENTERING TO INSTALL ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE DEVICE FOUND TO BE CONSTITUTIONAL.
Pursuant to court authorization,1 federal officers made an un-
announced forcible intrusion into Salvatore Agrusa's place of busi-
ness,2 while it was vacant and closed to the public. The federal of-
ficers entered for the purpose of installing an electronic surveillance
device. Upon termination of the court authorized surveillance,3 the
officers again forcibly entered the vacant premises, this time to re-
move the device. The evidence secured in this fashion was subse-
quently admitted at trial and aided in Agrusa's conviction for viola-
tion of the federal firearms statute. 4 On appeal, Agrusa contended
60. The Court noted in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973) that "since the
defense is not of a constitutional dimension, Congress may address itself to the question
and adopt any substantive definition of the defense that it may find desirable." Id. at 433.
61. Despite support from the commentators, only a few states have adopted the minority
approach. See Park, supra note 17, at 167n.3.
62. ,VORKING PAPERS, supra note 6, at 304.
63. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958).
64. Id.
1. The government's application for authorization to conduct electronic sur-
veillance was submitted to the Honorable Elno B. Hunter, United States District Judge
for the Western District of Missouri on February 28, 1974.
2. Agrusa operated an auto body shop in Independence, Missouri.
3. The authorization was issued by Judge Hunter the same day as applied for, Feb-
ruary 28, 1974. The authorization was issued pursuant to Title III of the Onmibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1971).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 922(a) (1) (1971), dealing in firearms without a license, however, is not
one of the offenses for which the court may authorize electronic interception of oral
communications under 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1971). The application for authorization to con-
duct electronic surveillance was made stating that probable cause existed that Agrusa
Was, in fact, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 659, 2315, and 371 (1971) for which 18 U.S.C. § 2516
(1971) authorized the admission of evidence obtained through court authorized electronic
surveillance. The government obtained a supplemental order, required under 1S U.S.C. §
2517 (1971), which authorized the use of the intercepted communications before the grand
